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DEFENDING THE INDIGENT DURING
A WAR ON CRIME
John A. Martint
and Michelle Travis
INTRODUCTION
For nearly a decade, Americans have engaged in a war on
crime of unprecedented proportion. Shrill political rhetoric,
massive government spending, and intensive media exposure
fuel the war effort. For example, to gain political advantage,
President Bush and his advisors labeled a $3 billion, Democratinitiated crime bill "pro-criminal," even though the bill includes
more than fifty new capital offenses and relaxed search and
seizure standards.' A near doubling of tax dollars dedicated to
police, courts, and corrections mirrors an almost 30% increase in
the number of law enforcement personnel in the United States
during the past decade.2 Gang violence, crackhouse busts,
victimization of the elderly, and seemingly random "drive-by"
murders are familiar news stories reported throughout the
nation.3
Drug law offenders in general, and illicit drug users in
urban areas in particular, provide the raw material for staggering "enemy" body counts. Drug arrests per year nationwide
increased nearly 43% between 1977 and 1987; from about
569,000 cases in 1977 to over 811,000 cases in 1987. In 1988,
drug arrests increased 43% to 1,555,000 and in 1989 rose by
another 19% over the count for 1988. 4

t Director of Justice System and Family Policy Programs at the Center For
Public Policy Studies, Denver, Colorado.
ItCandidate for J.D., Stanford University; B-A_, Cornell University.
' Clifford Krauss, After Senate Backs Bush and Blocks Defeats Anti-Crime
Bill, Congress Goes Home, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1991, at D22.
2 1991 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATIsTIcAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 18687 (1991).
'See, e.g., James N. Baker and Regina Elam, ProgramsThat Can Make a
Difference, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 11, 1989, at 28; George J. Church, FightingBack;
Bush DeclaresAnother War on Drugs but It May Not Help Much, TIME, Sept.
11, 1989, at 12; Gustavo A. Goriti, How to Fight the Drug War, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, July 1989, at 70.
"John A. Martin, Drugs, Crime, and Urban Trial CourtManagement: The
Unintended Consequences of the War on Drugs, 8 YALE L. & POLY REv. 117,
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Surprisingly, the nation launched the war on crime and
has sustained it in what is shaping-up to be an increasingly
peaceful era. A typical American's chance of being a crime
victim is considerably less than in the late 1970s.5 Crime
victimization against the elderly (a powerful force in local, state,
and national politics) has dropped so rapidly that by the early
1990s, the elderly, who account for nearly 12% of the nation's
population, are the victims in only 2% of all crimes committed
and 0.3% of violent crimes.6 Moreover, the chances of a police
officer being killed in the line of duty have fallen to less than
one-half of the chances two decades ago,' and the size of the
historically most crime-prone age-segment of the U.S. population, those aged sixteen to twenty-five, has declined rapidly.8
Still, even if the rhetoric and reality of crime and crime
control soon become synchronized, it seems likely that the
legacy of the war on crime will be substantial. The lingering
consequences will haunt - perhaps most of all - our courts and
those charged with providing adequate defense for the nation's
numerous indigent criminal defendants.
Felony caseloads
nearly doubled in the typical U.S. trial court over the past
decade, with courts in urban areas experiencing even more
dramatic increases. Drug arrests are a rapidly increasing
proportion of total arrests and now constitute one-half of all
criminal cases in many urban trial courts.9
The increasing number of defendants in many jurisdictions
reveals only a small part of the impact of the war on crime. In

118 (1990). See also INFO. PLEASE ALMANAC 825 (1991) (Estimated Arrests
1989).
5 1989 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BJS DATA
REPORT, 1989 18 (1990) [hereinafter 1989 BJS DATA REPORT].
6 1989 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 234 & 250 (Timothy J. Flanagan &
Kathleen Maguire, eds., 1990) [hereinafter 1989 SOURCEBOOK].
7 1989 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 401.
8

See, e.g., Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, Age and the Explanation
of Crime, 89 AM. J. SOC., 552 (1983); D. Wayne Osgood, et al., Time Trends
and Age Trends in Arrests and Self-Reported Illegal Behavior, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 389 (1989); Yossi Shavit & Arye Rattner, Age, Crime, and the Early Life
Course, 93 AM. J. SOC., 1457 (1988); Darrell Steffensmeier, et al., Relatiue
Cohort Size and Youth Crime in the U.S., 1953-1984, 52 AM. SOC., REV. 702
(1987).
s Martin, supra note 4, at 119. See also Courts and the 'War on Drugs," 73
JUDICATURE 236 (1990).
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this article we will show that the war on crime also creates a
hostile climate for providing indigent defense in the nation's
state and federal courts. An increasing number of "policysensitive" drug cases, an alteration of plea policies, mandatory
sentencing and de jure limitations on judicial discretion, increased prosecutorial power, and jail and prison overcrowding
all characterize this hostile climate.
This article begins with a detailed description of the
characteristics and trends of the current war on crime. Section
II examines the implications for courts and indigent defense.
I. CHARACTERISTICS AND TRENDS
OF THE WAR ON CRIME
A. CHARACTERISTICS AND TRENDS
Paradoxical trends define the terrain on which the crime
war is now being waged. Crime, as measured by victimization
against individuals and households, declined steadily over the
last twenty years, but arrests for some crimes increased dramatically. Despite a period of declining drug use among many
segments of the U.S. population, especially young people, the
national mobilization against illicit drugs persists. Although
American streets are becoming safer, public fear of crime is
increasing. Even though incarceration rates are at record levels
and prison sentences are longer in duration, the perception is
one of leniency in the judicial system.
This section examines the nature of crime, trends in crime
control, and the sources of those trends to provide a detailed
description of an increasingly hostile indigent defense environment. That hostility results as much from political rhetoric and
its effect on public opinion as from violence and theft.
1. Victimization Declines, but Law Enforcement Activity
Increases
Victimization rates for crimes against persons and house-

holds have declined during the last twenty years. 10 Every type
of crime examined in the annual National Crime Survey declined between 6% and 33% during the period from 1975 to

See GEORGETE BENNET, CRIME WARPS: THE FUTURE OF CRIME IN
AMERICA 1-16 (2d rev. ed. 1989).
10
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1988, the most recent dates for which complete data is available."
The proportion of American households affected by
theft or violent crime has not increased in the last fifteen years.
Despite the media attention directed at violent crime, the rate
of murder and non-negligent manslaughter decreased by just
over 13%, from 9.7 to 8.4 persons per 100,000, from the late
1970s to the late 1980s. 12 Moreover, theft against individuals
and households still constitutes 84% of all crime in America.
(See Table 1).
Crime against the elderly has declined rapidly beginning
in the mid-1970s and elderly victims now account for a smaller
fraction of all U.S. crime victims than in the 1970s. At 4.1
victims per 1000 in the population, the victimization rate for
violent crime against the elderly is 47% less today than in 1975,
and is only one-seventh of the rate for the general population.
In addition, personal theft from elderly victims has declined
25% to a rate of 18.3 victims per 1000. The elderly's household
property victimization has fallen 35% to 77.7 victims per
1000.13
The changing demographic composition of the nation suggests similar declines in victimization rates over the next few
decades. As the percentage of elderly in the population continues to grow, victimization should continue to decline. 4 Historically, rates of arrest for property crime have peaked at age
sixteen, dropped in half by age twenty-two, and dropped in half
again by age thirty. Violent-crime arrests rates have peaked at
about age eighteen and dropped in half by age thirty. 5 The
number of persons in what is by far the most crime-prone age
group, ages sixteen to twenty-five years, will decline during the
next few decades. The number of younger Americans will not
begin to approach the number of young baby-boomers alive

"1989 BJS DATA REPORT, supra note 5, at 18.
Debra C. Moss, Drug Cases Clog the Courts, 76 A.B.A. J. 34, 36 (1990).
13
'4

1989 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 234, 250.
See BENNEiT, supra note 10, at 2.

16 See supra note 8.
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TABLE 1

U.S. Crime Victimization Trends 1975 to 1988
(% All Crime in Parentheses)

Per 1000

1988
Victimization Rate
Per 1000

% Change
inl Victimization
19to
1988
1988

Rape

0.9
(0.3)

0.6
(0.4)

-29.7

Robbery

6.8
(2.9)

5.3
(2.9)

-22.2

Assault

25.2
(10.9)

23.7
(13.2)

-5.7

Total
Violent

32.8
(14.2)

29.6
(16.5)

-9.7

Larceny
with
Contact

3.1
(1.3)

2.5
(1.4)

-20.7

Larceny
with No
Contact

92.9
(40.2)

68
(37.9)

-26.8

Total
Theft

96
(41.5)

70.5
(39.3)

-26.6

Burglary

91.7
(17.2)

61.9
(16.1)

-32.5

Larceny

125.4
(23.5)

90.2
(23.5)

-28.1

Motor
Vehicle
Theft

19.5
(3.6)

17.5
(4.6)

-10.2

236.5
(44.3)

169.6
(44.2)

-28.3

1975
Victimization Rate

OFFENSE:

Violent
Crime

PERSONAL
VTIO
IZATION

Personal

Theft

HOUSEHOLD
VICTIEMZATION

Total
Household

1989 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS
220-222 (Timothy J. Flanagan and Kathleen Maguire, eds., 1990).
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during the 1970s, when crime peaked, until the middle of the
next century, if ever again."
Although victimization rates declined over the last twenty
years, law enforcement activity has increased, so that today the
number of people arrested in the United States is at a record
level. Between 1979 and 1988, the total number of arrests in
the nation increased by just under 22%. The increase in arrests, however, is not uniform across different types of crime.
Arrests for burglary (-17.2%), drunkenness (-33.6%), and disorderly conduct (-8.6%) declined from 1979 to 1988, while the
number of robbery arrests (+0.4%) remained nearly constant. In
contrast, the number of arrests for assault increased by 40.7%,
for larceny theft crimes by 22.7%, and for driving while intoxicated by 15.2%. Most startling, arrests for drug offenses increased by 89.9%, considerably more
than any other type of
17
offense during the nine year period.
2. Influx of Drug Cases Changes the Focus of the Judicial
System
The influx of drug cases not only resulted in more routine
work for the justice system, but also created an unprecedented
amount of politically sensitive work. In the present political
environment, drug cases, especially those involving the sale of
drugs, acquire special status. District attorneys, state attorneys, and other local, state, and federal officials are often
requested to redirect their efforts from other areas to the supposed "crisis" created by drug sales and drug use.'" State
statutes regularly single out drug offenders for extraordinary
treatment, and the war on drugs is almost always a justification
for the funding of new jails and prisons. 9 Projected effect on
the drug problem often determines allocation of public resourc-

6 See

generally KEN DYCHTWALD & JOE FLOWER, AGE WAVE: THE CHAL-

LENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF AN AGING AMERICA (1989); LANDON Y. JONES,
GREAT EXPECTATIONS, AMERICA AND THE BABY BOOM GENERATION 166-75
(1980); PAUL C. LIGHT, BABY BOOMERS (1989).

"' 1989 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 425.
18 See, e.g., JAMES A. INCIARDI, THE DRUG LEGALIZATION DEBATE 9-13

(1991).
'9 See, e.g., OFFICE OF NAT. DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG
CONTROL STRATEGY 24-26 (1989) [hereinafter NAT'L DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY].
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es.2" Thus, in many ways, the intense political attention paid
to drug cases is similar to the attention traditionally accorded
violent crimes, such as murder and kidnapping. However,
unlike murder and kidnapping, the potential number of drug
cases within urban areas appears unlimited.
Federal prosecution, conviction, and incarceration trends
perhaps best represent the emphasis on fighting drug related
crimes in our criminal justice system. The total number of
federal drug offense prosecutions increased 153% from 1980 to
1987, from 7003 prosecutions to 17,729. Prosecution rates in
drug cases increased from 73% of those arrested in 1980 to 78%
in 1987, and are now higher than the prosecution rates of any
other type of crime."' Conviction rates increased from 74% in
1980 to 85% in 1987. The number of defendants convicted in
federal courts for drug possession offenses showed the most
dramatic increase - just over 340%.2 Between 1980 and 1987,
the number of federal drug offenders sentenced to prison for
drug possession increased by 434.2%, and for those convicted of
drug trafficking the number increased by 169.2%." The average length of the prison sentence imposed by federal district
courts increased 44% over the same period. 4 By the end of
1989, for the 16,834 defendants charged with drug law violations in United States district courts, the conviction rate was
nearly 84% (14,139), and 77% (10,838) of those convicted received prison sentences. 5
3. Police Officers Are Safer Today Than They Were in the
Past
Contrary to popular belief, American streets are significantly less hazardous for police officers today than in the
past - perhaps the best indication of the inaccurate perception

' See, e.g., id. at 111-24; STEVEN WIsOTsKY, BREAKING THE IMPASSE IN
THE WAR ON DRUGS 4-5 (1986); John Haaga & Peter Router, The Limits of the
Czar's Ukase: Drug Policy at the Local Level, 8 YALE L. & POLY REV. 36
(1990); Jerome H. Skolnick, A Critical Look at the National Drug Control
Strategy, 8 YALE L. & POLY REV. 75 (1990).
21 1989 BJS DATA REPORT, supra note 5, at 36-37.
22

Id.

2

1989 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 504.

Id. at 494.
2 Id. at 492-493.
2
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of crime trends. For example, fewer officers died in the line of
duty in 1990 than during any year since 1968. While over 3.5
per 10,000 police officers were killed on the job in 1971, the
ratio dropped below 1.5 per 10,000 officers by 1989.26 Even in
the nation's five largest cities, the number of officers killed on
the job declined 38% between 1980 and 1990. Not only are
police officers half as likely to be killed on the job today than
twenty years ago, but they are also half as likely to shoot
someone else.
4. Casual Drug Use Declines But HabitualUse Remains
High
National Institute of Drug Abuse surveys reveal that the
number of Americans using illegal drugs fell dramatically
between the mid and late 1980s. In 1988, 10.2 million Americans admitted to using marijuana in the past month, 8 million
less than in 1985. The number of people in 1988 admitting to
cocaine use in the past month was 2.9 million, half that recorded for 1985.28 Most pronounced is the decline in illegal drug
use among young people. In yearly surveys conducted over the
past decade, high school seniors reported decreased use of
nearly every type of drug. From 1979 to 1989, the percentage of
seniors who reported using a particular drug in the last thirty
days decreased for marijuana (36.5% to 16.7%), hallucinogens
(4.0% to 2.2%), cocaine (5.7% to 2.8%), opiates other than heroin
(2.4% to 1.6%), sedatives (4.4% to 1.6%), tranquilizers (3.7% to
1.3%), alcohol (71.8% to 60.0%), and cigarettes (34.4% to
28.6%).29
Habitual cocaine and crack use, in contrast, has declined
little, if at all, since the mid-1980s. The 1991 National Institute

2'

Timothy Egan, New Faces, and New Roles, for the Police, N.Y. TIMES,

Apr. 25, 1991, at Al.
27 Timothy Egan, Less Risk for Officers, Nationwide Data Show, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1991, at B10. See Egan, supra note 26.
' Judy Treible, A Scoreboardfor the Anti-Drug Campaign, BOULDER DAILY
Aug. 29, 1989, at 3 (citing Drug Enforcement Administration,
General Accounting Office, Office of Management and Budget, National
Institute on Drug Abuse, and FBI Uniform Crime Report).
CAMERA,

2 1989 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 311 (The percentage of seniors that
reported using heroin in the last 30 days increased from .2% to .3%). See also
Laurel Shaper Walters, Youth Drug Use Declines, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Apr. 25, 1990, at 13.
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of Drug Abuse annual survey reported that 855,000 Americans
used cocaine frequently or about once a week, a considerable
increase over the 606,000 habitual users recorded in 1990.30
In addition, the prices of those illegal drugs has declined dramatically, despite tremendous increases in its purity and quality
when sold on the street. Crack in particular remains cheap and
plentiful.3 1
5. Public Fear of Crime and Drug Use Continues to
Increase
Although victimization rates have decreased since the mid1970s, the fear of crime and disapproval of drug use have
increased. A series of national public opinion polls conducted in
1989 revealed that 84% of the survey participants believed that
more crime existed in the United States in 1989 than in the
previous year, s ' induced in part by national media crime war
images. Only 53% of the same survey group felt that there was
actually more crime in their own area.3 Additionally, 62% of
those surveyed expected crime to increase over the next ten
years.'
The 1989 polls also revealed significant public fear over
the leniency of the criminal justice system. Ironically, while
prison incarceration rates rise to their highest levels ever in
modern American history, 5 83% of those respondents surveyed
felt that courts were "not harsh enough" in criminal cases.
Contrary to the opinion of those surveyed, judges gave longer
mandatory sentences in 1989 than ever before. In 1988, 43% of
those surveyed favored prohibitions on plea bargaining as a way

o See Joseph B. Treaster, Use of Cocaine and Heroin Rises Among Urban
Youth, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1991, at A18; john a. powell & Eileen B.
Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The National Purse, the Constitution
and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 557 (1991).
'31 1987 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 289 (Timothy J. Flanagan & Katherine
M. Jamieson, eds., 1988) [hereinafter 1987 SOURCEBOOK; JAMES A. INCIARDI,
THE WAR ON DRUGS: HEROIN, COCAINE, CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 82 (1986).
32 1989 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 142.
3

Id.

34

Id. at 143.

" See Patrick A. Langan, America's Soaring Prison Population, 251
SCIENCE 1568 (1991).

78

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 1:69

to combat crime in the United States3 6 and 79% indicated that
they worried more that some criminals were "being let off too
easily" than that "the constitutional rights of some people
accused of committing a crime [were] not being upheld."37
Only 16% were more concerned about upholding a defendant's
constitutional rights.3 8
In a 1989 national Gallup Poll, public opinion favored
various anti-crime proposals. Sixty-eight percent of the sample
surveyed favored the prohibition of bail for those accused of
violent crimes. Eighty-two percent wanted more difficult standards for parole for those convicted of violent crimes. Sixty
percent favored enacting tougher gun control laws.3 9 However,
the public did not support permitting the police to search homes
without warrants; 79% opposed this option.40
A closer look at the opinion data implies that the public
may not support individual measures of crime control, initiated
by the federal government, if the financial costs of those measures are too high. Even though a majority of respondents said
that they favored individual tactics that involved stricter enforcement, prosecution, and sentencing, only a minority suggested that government should channel funds toward these methods. As an alternative, a majority of respondents (61%) felt that
to combat crime in the United States the government should
allocate additional money and effort to confront the social and
economic problems that contribute to crime, such as unemployment, a weak economy, and an inadequate school system. Only
32% of those surveyed believed that the government should
spend more money on crime deterrence via improved law enforcement, additional prisons, police, and judges.4 1 Moreover,
by 1990, 40% of those surveyed indicated that the government
should put the majority of money and effort toward the education of young people about the dangers of drugs, while signifi-

36 1989 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 156.
37Id. at 159.

38 Id.
" Support for tougher gun control laws varied along both geographic and
gender lines. The group that reported the most support for stricter firearm
legislation consisted primarily of women (68%), and residents of large cities
(66%), while approval was significantly less among men (52%), and among
rural residents (48%). Id. at 156-157.
4
DId.
41
Id. at 158.
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cantly fewer wanted funds used for the arrest of drug sellers
(19%) and drug users (4%).42
The current war on crime and drugs is occurring in an era
when public attitudes about illicit drug use are increasingly
negative. From 1979 to 1989, the percentage of high school
seniors who disapproved of "smoking marijuana occasionally"
rose from 45.3% to 77.2%, and the percentage who disapproved
43
of "trying cocaine once or twice" rose from 74.7% to 90.5%.

During the same ten year period, the percentages of high school
seniors who indicated a "great risk" occurred from "trying
marijuana once or twice" (9.4% to 23.6%) or "smoking marijuana
regularly" (42.0% to 77.5%), or "taking cocaine regularly" (69.5%
to 90.2%) also increased.44 Despite the decline in drug use, a
1989 general population survey reported that 53% of the public
expected drug abuse to worsen in the next ten years. 4' Gallup
Poll results show that the number of people who describe drug
abuse as the "most important problem facing our country today,"
increased from 2% in January 1985 to 27% by May 1989.46
The above statistics range from criminal victimization
rates to popular opinion on drug use. Taken together they
illustrate some of the factors that contribute to the increasingly
hostile environment in which attorneys attempt to represent
indigent criminal defendants. The remaining three subsections
continue to describe this environment.
6. "Get Tough" PoliticalRhetoric
President Bush set the tone and broad agenda of the
recent crime bill debate in 1989, when the National Institute of
Justice Reports outlined his program for battling crime.47 The
President's plan emphasized the importance of minimum sentencing, the enactment of the death penalty for more violent
crimes involving firearms, and the expansion of the federal
prison capacity. Additionally, the President stressed the enhancement of prosecution and the increase in enforcement
42

Id. at 206.

at 194.
"Id. at 191.
45
Id. at 143.
41 1989 BJS DATA REPORT, supra note 5, at 42.
4
1 PresidentBush ProposesNew Anti-Crime Measures,NATL INST. OF JUST.
REP., July-Aug. 1989, at 7.
43Id.
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personnel, with the simultaneous restriction of plea bargaining
practices, policies that may directly affect indigent defense. He
explained, "[w]e're going to take back the streets. By taking
criminals off the street. It's an attack on all four fronts - new
laws to punish them, new agents to arrest them, new prosecutors to convict them, and new prisons to hold them."4
The tone set by the White House, the poor economy, the
potential vulnerability of Democrats to accusations of being
"soft" on crime issues, and the grim realities of life in
many
urban areas are all factors contributing to the hostile climate for
indigent defense. These factors also stifle honest debate necessary to respond adequately to the nation's crime and other
social problems.
Politically, the Democrats are in a difficult position on the
crime issue. They cannot argue that the crime problem in the
nation is on the decline. To do so would require Democrats to
ignore the horrible conditions in many urban areas where they
retain high voter support. The Democrats would also risk
creating the appearance that crime conditions are improving as
a result of the "get-tough" White House policy. Meanwhile,
Republicans want to stay tough and play to public sentiment,
regardless of the evidence about crime trends and the sources of
those trends. Like the threat of communism, the threat of ever
increasing crime has served as a justification for important
components of Republican dogma over the past decades.
The rhetoric and maneuvering that accompanied the recent
crime bill debate reveal some of the consequences of the "let's
get tougher on crime" climate. One example is that stiff
anti-crime proposals carrying a politically attractive tough-oncrime message make policy makers hesitant to discuss potential
side effects on case backlogs, prison overcrowding, and indigent
defense for fear of diluting the tough stance and thereby alienating voters. As a result, policy makers tend to ignore many
important issues, thus making informed, balanced decision
making impossible.
Fueling the trend toward stiff anti-crime legislation are
the enormous incentives facing Democratic lawmakers to reach
agreements on crime control measures. Democrats realize that
the Bush Administration will use the lack of a crime agreement
in the 1992 presidential election to better its position. 49 Repre-

4 Id.; see also NAT'L DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, supra note 19, at 9.
4 Gwen Ifill, Senate's Rule for Its Anti-Crime Bill: The Tougher the
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sentative Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.), Democratic chair of the
House Judiciary Committee's panel on Crime and Criminal
Justice, said that on any stiff crime control measures, "[c]ongressmen and senators are afraid to vote no... [e]ven if they
don't think [the measure] will accomplish anything.""
Proposals involving stiff sentencing and incarceration are among
the most politically attractive. "The Senate's rush to prove that
it is doing something to curb crime is so great that some traditional arguments have been all but abandoned."51 Senator
Alfonse D'Amato's (R-N.Y.) proposal for mandatory prison
sentences of up to 30 years for crimes against federal authorities involving firearms is an example of this eagerness to demonstrate the Senate's toughness on sentencing and incarceration. Eighty-eight senators voted for the proposal over objections that the provision was an unacceptable expansion of
federal jurisdiction into state and local prosecutions. "'It's tough
to vote against tough sentences for criminals,' said one Democratic senate aide. 'Who is going to vote against giving thirty
years for shooting someone with a silencer on federalism
grounds?"'52
Although each anti-crime measure offers potential for
crime reduction, a concern, voiced by Senator Bob Graham
(D-Fla.), is that Congressional actions are increasingly being
made "in the ignorance of what the implication would be for the
totality of our Federal criminal justice system. 5 3 The recent
dramatic acceleration in prison overcrowding, a topic addressed
in Section II, is a concrete illustration of potential implications.
Despite prison overcrowding and the cost of providing new
incarceration facilities, many policy-makers find that the risk of
being labeled "soft on crime" is too great to propose alternatives
to incarceration and mandatory sentencing. Congress continues
to establish mandatory minimum sentences for various drug-related offenses, despite protests from judicial organizations.'
"'I don't think any politician wants to be seen as soft on crime,'
Provision,the Better, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1991, at A6.
50

Id.
51 Id.

52 id.
3 Id.
"Michael deCourcey Hinds, Bush Aides Push State Gun Cases Into U.S.
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1991, at Al; Aaron Epstein, JudgesRail at Stiff
Drug Sentences, DENVER POST, May 11, 1991, at 4A.
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said Robert Dickover, chief of the research branch of the
California's Department of Corrections. 'The politicians have
painted themselves into a corner. They... have promised more
'
from the policy of incarceration than they can deliver."55
Finally, as the scope and momentum of the nation's war on
crime and the distortion of reality accompanying it increases,
accurate information about unintended consequences, including
possible affects on the quality of indigent defense, is more
difficult for policy-makers to obtain and address. The fear of
voter reprisal if one appears soft on crime, by questioning the
impact of the crime war and by supporting rights for criminals,
stifles honest debate. Describing the overall trend of the
Senate's biannual crime debates, Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) said that "[t]he truth is, we're engaged in a crass
political contest about which of us - Democrats or Republicans
- hate crime more."56
7. Supreme Court Decisions Force ConstitutionalLaw
InterpretationToward the Right
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions will likely
affect the daily operation of justice more profoundly than much
of the judicial activity in the past several decades. In 1991, the
Court overruled four major precedents. Each of these new
decisions narrowed the scope of procedural and evidentiary
criminal protections. Enforcement tactics developed and implemented in the nation's war on crime were a factor initiating
these recent cases. Easing procedural restrictions for admitting
prosecutorial evidence into trials and limiting challenges by
defendants to their treatment while in the criminal justice
process create new impediments to providing adequate indigent
defense.
a. Easing Evidentiary Restrictions on Prosecutions
The Court ruled 6-3 in Florida v. Bostick 7 that police do
not necessarily violate Constitutional protections against unfair

' Peter Kerr, Crowded PrisonsPose Tough Choice for Florio, N.Y. TIMES,
May 19, 1991, at A28.
' Gwen Ifill, Bush Drops Planfor a Courtfor Aliens, N.Y. TIMES, June 21,
1991, at A14.
57 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
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searches and seizures by boarding buses and obtaining passengers' permission to search their luggage. Bostick arose over
one of the latest drug interdiction innovations, namely "working
the buses."" The sheriffs deputies in Broward County, Florida routinely boarded public buses and, "without articulable
suspicion," asked passengers if they could search the passengers' luggage.59 After advising passenger Terrance Bostick
of his right to refuse a search, Bostick consented to the search
and officers found cocaine in his luggage. Prosecutors used the
cocaine as evidence against him on a drug trafficking charge.
The Florida Supreme Court accepted Bostick's motion to suppress the evidence based on violations of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court invalidated the state
court's per se rule that classified every bus encounter as a
seizure. The Court instead ruled that, "in order to determine
whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court
must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter
to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to
decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter."60 Although the officers lacked the reasonable suspicion
required to justify a seizure, the decision made suspicion unnecessary by ruling that such bus raids do not, by themselves,
constitute a seizure. The majority held that, "[t]he encounter
will not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its
consensual nature." 1 "IT]he mere fact that Bostick did not
feel free to leave the bus does not mean that the police seized
62
him.1

Bostick represents the judicial trend towards easing
evidentiary restrictions in criminal prosecutions. The decision
follows a string of rulings beginning in the early 1980s which
enables law enforcement officials to stop and question passengers in airport terminals' and other public locations," to ask
0 Id. at 2389.
59

Id. at 2384-2385.

6o

Id. at 2389.
Id. at 2386.

61

2Id. at 2387.
Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1984) (per curiam).
INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
497-498 (1983) (plurality opinion) (dictum).
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to examine an individual's identification,65 and to request
consent to search luggage,' without the level of suspicion
ordinarily required by the Fourth Amendment. However, as we
describe later in this section, even though individuals may
refuse the request of law enforcement officers, the likelihood of
an individual fully understanding their opportunity to do so
seems remote.
The Supreme Court overruled precedent from the past
twenty-five years in a number of other telling cases in 1991. In
California v. Acevedo,"7 the Court limited Arkansas v. Sanders," which had restricted police authority to search automobiles lawfully stopped without search warrants. Acevedo allows
the police to search a container within an automobile without a
warrant whenever probable cause exists to believe that the
container holds contraband or evidence.6 9
Arizona v.
7 ° limited Chapman v. Californiav" which, inter
Fulminante
alia,had barred the use of any coerced confession in a criminal
trial. Fulminante held that using a coerced confession at trial
could be "harmless error" if other evidence was adequate to
73
2
Finally, in Payne v. Tennessee,
support a guilty verdict.
the Court overturned two recent 5-4 Supreme Court decisions,
7 5 Payne
Booth v. Maryland74 and South Carolina v. Gathers.
held that the Constitution permits introducing, during the
sentencing phase of capital murder trials, evidence concerning

' Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216; Royer, 460 U.S. at 501; United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980).
6 Royer, 460 U.S. at 501.
6 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
68 442 U.S. 753.
'Acevedo,

111 S. Ct. at 1983.

111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
7' 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
72
Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1253; See also Linda Greenhouse, High Court
70

Widens Evidence Allowed in CapitalCases, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1991, at Al.
73 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
7 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
75 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
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the victim and the impact of the victim's death."6 Both Booth
and Gathers had barred this evidence. 7
These recent Supreme Court decisions limit the procedural
and evidentiary protections available in criminal cases. The
gradual narrowing of evidentiary restrictions and broadening of
allowable search practices promote the Bush Administration's
policies on crime and drugs. However, despite visible and
desirable gains, the policies have had less visible and less
desirable effects on the quality of indigent defense. In particular, the courts have eliminated some tools once available to
defense attorneys to challenge the legality of a search and
seizure, often the single most important issue in a drug case. In
addition, by allowing what were once considered unlawful, as
well as distasteful, law enforcement practices, recent decisions
have contributed to the hostile climate surrounding indigent
defense in urban trial courts.
As an illustration, both the majority and the dissent in
Bostick acknowledged the difficulties of determining the constitutionality of innovative crime enforcement practices in the
current political climate. The majority noted that the Court was
"not empowered to suspend constitutional guarantees so that
the Government may more effectively wage a 'War on
Drugs."'7 8 However, as Justice O'Connor explained, "this Court
is not empowered to forbid law enforcement practices simply
because it considers them distasteful. 79 Speaking in dissent,
now-retired Justice Marshall remarked, 'To]ur Nation, we are
told, is engaged in a 'war on drugs.' No one disputes that it is
the job of law-enforcement officials to devise effective weapons
for fighting this war. But the effectiveness of a law-enforcement
technique is not proof of its constitutionality."8 Justice Marshall also noted that "a passenger unadvised of his rights and
otherwise unversed in constitutional law has no reason to know
that the police cannot hold his refusal to cooperate against
him.""1 "Rather than requiring the police to justify the coercive tactics employed here, the majority blames respondent for
76 Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2606-2607. See also Excerpts From Opinion
Evidence About Murder Victims, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1991, at A14.
77
Booth, 482 U.S. at 501-502; Gathers, 490 U.S. at 810.

"' Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2389 (1991).
79
Id.

8 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81

Id. at 2393.
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his own sensation of constraint." 2 Immersed in an environment fueled by the rhetoric of "war," criminal defendants are
increasingly likely to feel constrained to abide by the orders of
law enforcement officers. The historically powerless population
of the indigent, who tend to be uninformed of their constitutional rights, is likely to be adversely affected by these decisions.
As a result of Bostick, public transportation searches are a
more appealing tactic for police because they allow access to
usable evidence without the level of suspicion required for other
types of searches. Public defenders, already overburdened by
the increase in drug arrests, will likely face an increase in the
number of indigent defendants. The Court's ruling does protect
potential defendants by requiring luggage searches to remain
"consensual." However, determining whether a defendant felt
free to decline the officers' requests, "or otherwise terminate the
encounter," is likely to exacerbate the logistical difficulties
involved in determining the validity of this new tactic.
Payne was also not without dissenters. Justice Stevens
dissented based on the influence of the war on crime rhetoric.
"Today's majority has obviously been moved by an argument
that has strong political appeal.""3

"Given . . . the political

appeal of arguments that assume that increasing the severity of
sentences is the best cure for the cancer of crime . . .today's

decision will be greeted with enthusiasm by a large number of
concerned and thoughtful citizens."'

Justice Marshall, again

in dissent, discussed his concerns that the court had overlooked
the possible adverse effects of the war on crime on sentencing
practices, including the imposition of long prison terms and the
death penalty. "Cast aside today are those condemned to face
society's ultimate penalty. Tomorrow's victims may be minorities, women or the indigent.""5
b. Narrowing Scope of Defense Mechanisms
The Court's 5-4 decision in Wilson v. Seiter86 represents
the narrowing scope of mechanisms that defendants may use to
8

2 Id. at 2394.

' Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2627 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8

Id. at 2631.

' Id. at 2625 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
8 111 S.Ct. 2321 (1991).
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challenge their treatment throughout the criminal justice
process. Pearly L. Wilson, an inmate of Ohio's Hocking Correctional Facility, sued prison officials after they ignored his
written complaints about prison overcrowding, inadequate
heating and cooling, unsanitary conditions, and the failure to
segregate physically and mentally ill inmates. The Court ruled
that inmates challenging confinement conditions must show not
only that the conditions are inhumane, but also that they
resulted from the "deliberate indifference" of prison officials.8 7
This ruling requires judges to inquire into the intentions of
prison officials." In addition, challenging overall prison conditions under the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment is now more difficult.
Wilson v. Seiter comes at a time when thirty-seven states
and the District of Columbia operate all or part of their correctional departments under federal court orders resulting from
suits initiated by prisoners, the American Civil Liberties Union,
and human rights groups.8 9 These court orders deal with
prison overcrowding, inadequacies in prison staffing levels,
health care provisions, and overall confinement conditions.9 0
The "deliberate indifference" requirement articulated in Wilson
shifts the focus from objective prison conditions to the state of
mind of prison officials. The Justice Department and the
American Civil Liberties Union jointly urged the Court to
continue interpreting the Eighth Amendment as establishing an
objective and mandatory standard of minimal prison conditions.9 1 However, the Court held it could not address problems
of prison overcrowding without inquiries into officials' intentions, because the intent requirement implicit in the Eighth
Amendment's term "punishment" could not be "ignored as policy
considerations might dictate."9

87Id. at 2326.
' See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Restrict Suits Challenging Prison
Conditions, N.Y. TIMEs, June 18, 1991, at Al [hereinafter Justices Restrict

Suits].
1989 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 109.
" Kerr, supra note 55, at A28 (New Jersey prisons are operating at 140%
capacity and California prisons are at twice their capacity). See also Langan,
supra note 35.
"' See Justices Restrict Suits, supranote 88, at Al.
92Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991).
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The dissent was primarily concerned that inmates could
not prevail on constitutional challenges to prison conditions if
the cause was a state legislature's unwillingness to pay for
prison improvements. Elizabeth Alexander, who argued for
Pearly L. Wilson, believes that the ruling is not necessarily
destructive to inmates' rights because she anticipates inmates
will be able to persuade judges that long-term prison inadequacies are the result of deliberate indifference.9 3 However, the
actual impact of Wilson will remain unclear until the courts
determine the standard for deliberate indifference.
The Wilson decision may delay decision-makers determinations of the effect that anti-crime policies have on the prison
system. As court dockets expand to include a rapidly increasing
number of drug cases, and as prison overcrowding worsens,
future Supreme Court decisions may make ignoring the side
effects of the war on crime even easier for policy-makers.
Indigent defendants entering the system amidst the current
political climate will find few ways to challenge court procedures
and prison conditions.
Cases restricting the use of writs of habeas corpus to challenge the constitutionality of convictions and sentences in
federal courts provide further evidence of the narrowing definition of prisoners' rights.
Both McCleskey v. Zant9 4 and
9
5
Coleman v. Thompson superseded Fay v. Noias6 which had
extended to most state prisoners the right to file habeas corpus
petitions in federal courts. As a result of these two decisions,
the burden in a second or subsequent petition for habeas corpus
often shifts to the prisoner to disprove abuse of the writ. A
petitioner can disprove abuse in two ways: by showing cause for
an earlier default and actual prejudice as a result of an alleged
violation of federal law or by demonstrating that failure to
consider claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice. 7
Moving in a similar direction are rulings on the constitutionality of mandatory sentencing. In Harmelin v. Michigan,
the Supreme Court held that the Constitution permits mandatory sentencing to life in prison without parole for nonviolent first
" Justices Restrict Suits, supra note 89, at Al.
9

111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).

95 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
372 U.S. 391 (1963).
97 McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1470; Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2565.
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offenses, including possession of 1.5 pounds of cocaine.9" That
ruling sharply limited Solem v. Helm99 in which the Court had
previously invalidated an identical sentence imposed on a man
convicted of passing a bad check. Harmelin suggests that mandatory sentences initiated as part of the war on drugs will be
difficult to challenge under the Eighth Amendment." °
Current trends also create barriers to defendants' release
from the system. The Supreme Court has diminished incentives
to negotiate alternatives to incarceration by upholding mandatory sentencing and making prison overcrowding less vulnerable
to lawsuits. Offenders who are potentially successful in a
rehabilitative program, including indigent defendants and
certain classes of drug offenders, will get swept more easily into
an increasingly crowded system. 10 1
8. Increasing Concentrationof Crime and Crime Control
Although the federal government is largely responsible for
the anti-crime and drug emphasis, crime and law enforcement
activity concentrates disproportionately on non-white residents
of urban areas. "Although the fight rages everywhere 'from sea
to shining sea,' the battle zones are primarily the inner cities,"
according to Ann Bailey, Committee member of the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association.'
Both victimization
rates and arrest statistics illustrate the extent to which crime,
especially violent and drug-related offenses, is focused increasingly in urban locations among non-white racial and ethnic
groups, especially African Americans.
Although the national household victimization rate was
24.6% in 1988, 30% of all urban households, and 29% of all
African American households, were touched by crime. 03 In
1988, the victimization rate for violent crimes was 40 per 1000

' Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
463 U.S. 277 (1983).
"o See Linda Greenhouse, MandatoryLife Term is Upheld in Drug Cases,
0

N.Y. TIMEs, June 28, 1991, at A15.
101 See also Jane Gross, Probationand Therapy Help Some Drug Users,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 21, 1991, at B6.
102 Ann Bailey, Legal Services, Poor Clients, and the "War on Drugs," 24
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 504 (1990).
1031989 BJS DATA REPORT, supra note 5, at 18.
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persons for African Americans, but only 28 per 1000 for
whites. °4 In that same year, 66% of all arrests and 70% of
drug arrests occurred in cities even though cities accounted for
only 55% of the total population.1 5
Arrest trends underscore the disparate effects of the recent
crime-fighting tactics on urban and non-urban areas and on
whites and African Americans. In 1988, 65.3% of all arrests
made in cities were of whites, while 32.8% were of African
Americans. However, arrest rates varied widely by race for
different types of crime. Of those arrested for property crimes,
63.3% were white and 34.6% were African American, while 51%
of those arrested for violent crimes were African American and
47.5% were white. Of the total arrests made for drug abuse
violations in cities, 55.5% were of whites and 43.8% were of
African Americans." °
In addition, while whites made up
65.3% of those arrested in cities, they comprised 80.3% in
suburban areas and 81.5% in rural counties. The percentage of
arrests of African Americans was highest in cities, at 32.8%,
while African Americans made up 18.9% of arrests in suburban
0 7
areas and 15.0% of arrests in rural counties.
Jail and prison population figures also reveal the uneven
impact of law enforcement priorities on America's black and
white populations. Even though African Americans accounted
for just over 12% of the United States population by the end of
the 1980s, on December 31, 1988, they accounted for 46% of the
entire prison population, and on June 30, 1989 they accounted
for 47% of that population."°
By the end of 1990, approximately 455 of every 100,000
U.S. residents were in prison, giving the United States the
highest incarceration rate in the world.'0 9 Incarceration rates
among African Americans, however, best reveal the effect of the
war on crime. "Black men are now four times more likely to be
incarcerated in the United States than they are in South Africa."" ° The incarceration rate for African American men by

0

' 4Id.

at 21.
1051989 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 434, 438, 441.
1

Id. at 434.

'0"Id. at 434, 438, 442. See also powell and Hershenov, supra note 30.
108 1989 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 573, 587.
109 U.S. World's Foremost Incarcerator,DENVER POsT, Feb. 11, 1992, at 3A.
110powell and Hershenov, supra note 30, at 569-70.
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the end of the 1980s was 3109 per 100,000.111 This figure is
nearly 5.5 times larger than the 567 per 100,000 rate recorded
for all African Americans in 1980.112
B. CRIME WARS, COURTS, AND INDIGENT DEFENSE: A
SUMMARY
Collectively, the six salient characteristics of the current
law and order mentality examined in this section contribute to
an increasingly hostile climate for indigent defense within the
American justice system. Moreover, myth and reality of crime
and crime control are now nearly indivisible. Confronting this
hostile climate has become extremely difficult. Ann Bailey
perceptively summarized our current situation when she noted
that: "When we use a 'war' analogy, we accept that we cannot
actually do battle against an inanimate thing; we declare war
against people. We accept that 'we' cannot win this war unless
there are people who are enemies, and somebody or many
somebodies must lose."1 1
"The War on Drugs presents an
opportunity to be liked and admired ...
The arguments to
employ adversarial tactics can be convincing."1 4
Declining victimization rates and stable or declining arrest
rates for most crimes over the past dozen years indicate that the
average American is less likely to be a crime victim now than in
the mid-1970s. The "aging" of the nation's population indicates
that these trends will continue throughout and beyond the
1990s. In addition, declining drug consumption rates among
casual users and less tolerant public attitudes towards drug use
(especially among younger people) suggest that both the crime
and drug epidemics have already peaked among the general
population.
Yet despite these gains, improvement in the climate for
indigent defense in the American justice system is unlikely in
the near future. The continuing widespread use of cocaine
among habitual users, the increasing concentration of law
enforcement activity and drug arrests in inner cities, the disintegration of urban areas, public fear of crime, and the populari-

...
Tom Wicker, The Iron Medal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1991, at A21.
112

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN

STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS ON DECEMBER 31, 1980 at 21 (1982).

" Bailey, supra note 102, at 504.
1141d.
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ty of "get tough" political rhetoric and legislation create unrelenting pressure on the justice system to solve this highly
visible, politically charged, multifaceted, and partially mythical
crime problem. Moreover, the relief from overcrowded case
dockets expected as a result of declining non-drug crime has not
appeared. The recent emphasis on combating drugs negated
many crime control gains of the past dozen years. Routine
crimes now take second place in the justice system to more
"serious" drug cases.
Finally, the disparate impact of crime and drug policies on
African Americans and whites contributes to heightened racial
tensions in the nation. 5 For example, aggressive law enforcement under the war on crime and drugs, coupled with
widespread crime and drug use in urban areas, leads many
African Americans to perceive white disdain for "their" problems. The disproportionate size of the African American population incarcerated in U.S. jails and prisons plays upon stereotypes of African American men. Injecting the bitterness and
hostility that frequently accompany polarized views about race
can only increase hostility towards indigent defense.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR ON CRIME AND
RESPONSES OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
A.

IMPLICATIONS FOR COURTS AND INDIGENT DEFENSE

"Pessimistic" and "frantic" describe the mood of many
criminal practitioners across the nation. Judges, administrators, public defenders and even prosecutors wonder aloud about
the long-term consequences the war on crime will have on criminal justice systems." 6 "America's urban trial courts could
soon become the first casualty in the war on drugs,""' 7 noted
one court administrator during a seminar held in 1989. In this
section we will examine the consequences of the war on crime
115 See

generally E.J. DIONNE, JR., WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITICS (1991)

(choices offered by liberals and conservatives fail to reflect Americans' true
values and concerns).
...See Robert D. Lipscher, The Judicial Response to the Drug Crisis: A
Report of an Executive Symposium Involving JudicialLeaders of the Nation's
Nine Most Populous States, STATE CT. J., Fall 1989, at 13.
.17John Clarke, Trial Court Administrator, Jersey City, New Jersey,
Remarks at a National Center For State Courts sponsored Seminar on Drug
Case Processing in Urban Trial Courts, Denver, Colorado (July 17-18, 1989).
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on criminal justice, including: (1) understaffed, under-funded
systems processing too many defendants and the escalating
levels of jail overcrowding; (2) increased prosecutorial power
throughout the system and increased resource disparity between
the defense and prosecution; and (3) declining judicial discretion. We will also examine some of the responses being developed: (1) increased plea bargaining, often according to untraditional policies; and (2) comprehensive caseflow management
programs.
1. Overburdened Justice Systems
Case backlogs and case processing times are growing in
federal and state jurisdictions throughout the nation. The
current war on crime and drugs accounts for much of the expanding workload. Responses to the workload are primarily to
add resources, undertake management innovations, and move
resources from one part of a system to another. However, none
of the strategies employed has proved successful.
In the last decade, the number of federal drug cases increased more than fivefold, from approximately 3100 in 1980, to
16,400 in 1990.118 During the same period, the number of
district judges increased by about 10%, from 516 to 575.19
The result is an enormous increase in backlogged cases. In
1990, the backlog of drug cases in federal courts reached over
7400, a sixfold increase from 1200 in the year before.12 ° Moreover, drug cases strain the court system in ways other than by
the impact of their shear numbers:
Drug cases are not only rising in raw numbers. At least in
some courts, they impose heavier burdens than do other
criminal cases. This may stem in part from related factors, such as mandatory minimum sentences for possessing
even small amounts of narcotics. Faced with such sentenc-

118

Hinds, supra note 54.

119 Id.; see generally Moss, supra note 12 (increased criminal prosecutions
have led to backlogs in many federal and state courts as well as prison
overcrowding).
'r As U.S. Spends More on Courts, Backlog Grows, Study Finds, N.Y.
Times, May 28, 1991, at A17.
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es, even guilty defendants will seek trial more often than
they would otherwise.' 2 '
The increase in the number of federal drug prosecutions
also burdens the already overcrowded federal prison system.
The number of defendants sentenced to prison for drug offenses
in district courts rose 177.4% between 1980 and 1987.122 Dur-

ing the same period, the length of the average federal prison
sentence for drug convictions rose 44%, whereas the average increase for all other crimes was 25%.'" The number of federal
prisoners convicted of drug-related offenses doubled in the past
two years to almost 33,000.'24 Federal prison system officials
report the system is currently operating at 160% of the designed
capacity,"2 with over half of the 61,000 federal prison inmates
serving
mandatory prison sentences from drug-related charg126
es.
Recent policy decisions increase the burden on federal
courts. Prior to 1986, primarily state courts tried drug offenses,
unless the case involved exceptional circumstances such as the
crossing of state lines. 27 However, since 1986, Congress has
passed a number of laws requiring federal courts to try an
increasing number of criminal cases.'"
The Bush Administration is fueling this attempt to increase the caseload at the federal level, by trying to establish a

system that prosecutes as many criminal cases involving firearms as possible in federal rather than state courts. One recent
proposal, "Operation Triggerlock," incorporates several politically attractive features for advancing the war on crime including
sentencing at the federal level, which generally results in
tougher prison sentences."2
121 Courts and the 'War on Drugs",supra note 9, at 236.

supra note 6, at 494.
m 1989 BJS DATA REPORT, supra note 5, at 37.

122 1989 SOURCEBOOK,

124

Epstein, supra note 54, at 4A.

' Hinds, supra note 54, at Al.
6Id.

12

27

1

Id.

12 See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 21 U.S.C. § 1501-1509 (1988);

Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, 41 U.S.C. § 701 (1988); Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.)
1837.
129 Hinds, supra note 54, at Al.
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Despite the Bush Administration's assurances that Operation Triggerlock would be "a major step in the Government's
priority campaign against street crime and violent offenders,"'13 federal judges are resisting the initiative. Judicial
organizations, including The Judicial Conference of the United
States, which administers the federal court system, oppose
diverting more drug cases to the federal level because of the
effect on the federal court caseload. 13 1 Drug cases now account for about one third of all federal criminal cases and judges
complain that as drug and gun cases fill the federal dockets,
"important constitutional issues.., await hearings for months
or years."132

Federal courts must meet stricter deadlines for

criminal cases, forcing civil cases to face increasingly lengthy
delays. The Southern District Court of California, for example,
tries fewer than 50 of the 1000 civil cases filed there each year,
because it must now spend more than 70% of its time on routine
drug and gun cases.3'
The Supreme Court has expressed great concern over the
federalization of crimes. In Chief Justice Rehnquist's end of the
year statement he "chastised Congress for unnecessary legislation overloading the courts."'" According to Rehnquist, "the
writers of the Constitution intended the federal judicial system
to have only a 'limited role reserved for issues where important
national interests predominate."""
Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor and Antonin Scalia also urged Congress to halt
increasing federal jurisdiction over criminal acts. "'Murder is
not a federal crime; murder of the president is,' Justice Scalia
told members of the House Appropriations subcommittee that
controls the court's budget. 'What has happened in recent years
is people have come
to think if its a big problem, then it's a
' 36
problem."
federal
State courts throughout the nation mirror the pattern of
increasing caseloads in the federal court system. However, the
"3Id. at B16. See also Nancy E. Roman, JusticesHammer Needless Laws,
WASH. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1992, at A4.
.31Hinds, supra note 54, at Al.
1321Id.
3

M

Id.
Roman, supra note 130, at A4.

1Linda Greenhouse, Ease Load on Courts,Rehnquist Urges, N.Y. TIMES,

Jan. 1, 1992, at A8 (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist).
136

Roman, supra note 130, at A4 (quoting Justice Scalia).
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magnitude of the demand on state court systems dwarfs that on
the federal system. In 1989, the total number of cases filed in
state courts reached nearly 100 million. 3 7 The enormous
increase in the federal drug caseload (from 1200 cases in 1989
to 7400 cases in 1990) is still less than the drug caseloads of the
state courts in many of the nation's large cities.'38
The increased caseload also effects the length of time required to dispose of cases. A recent comprehensive study of
twenty-six urban trial courts reported that the median time
from filing to disposition for civil cases ranged from about six
39
months in fast courts, to nearly two years in slower courts.
The study revealed that the median time from arrest to disposition of felony cases was 119 days, yet felony case processing
times of more than six months to more than one year were
common in many courts. 40 None of the courts met the American Bar Association Standards that stipulate that only 2% of a
court's felony caseload should take more than 180 days to
process. These figures are especially disturbing given that 95%
of cases were either plea bargained, settled, dismissed, or
disposed of by arbitration.''
Furthermore, state prison facilities have not kept pace
with inmate population growth. The nation's state prisons held
a record 610,000 inmates at the end of 1989, an increase of
63,000 from the previous year. 4 2 To respond adequately to
the inmate population growth would require building a 1000-bed
prison every six days." The inmate population of state and
137 David

B. Rottman & Brian J. Ostrom, Caseloads in the State Courts,

Volume, Composition, and Growth, STATE CT. J., Spring 1991, at 4.
'3 See generally JOHN GOERDT, EXAMINING COURT DELAY:

THE PACE OF

LITIGATION IN TWENTY-SIX URBAN TRIAL COURTS, 1987, at 72, 98 (1989) (felony
and drug-related case processing times) [hereinafter COURT DELAY]; John
Goerdt, Explaining The Pace of Civil Litigation: The Latest Evidence From 37
Large Urban Trial Courts, 14 JUST. SYS. J. 289 (1991) (discussing long case
processing time in state general jurisdiction courts) [hereinafter Civil Litigation].
139 Civil Litigation, supra note 138, at 294-296. See also COURT DELAY,
supra note 138, at 13.
140 COURT DELAY, supra note 138, at 53-55.
141 John A. Martin & Nancy C. Maron, Courts, Delay, and Interorganiza-

tional Networks: Managing an Essential Tension, 15 JUST. SYS. J. 268, 269
(1991).
142 Langan, supra note 35, at 1568.
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federal prisons increased by 7.3% during the first six months of
1989, a rate that exceeded any annual increase previously
recorded.'
The result of the incarceration binge is that by
the end of 1990, 771,000 people were in state and federal
prisons, and more than 396,000 were in local jails."
Certain states have especially pronounced increases in
incarceration. In California, for example, the prison population
more than quadrupled in the last decade, rising from 22,000 inmates in 1982 to well over 100,000 today."' In New Jersey,
the prison population also quadrupled, from 5800 in 1980 to its
current level of more than 23,000. This places New Jersey
prisons at 140% of their intended capacity. 4 About half of
those prisoners are in jail for violations of New Jersey drug laws
and are serving recently instituted mandatory prison terms."
2. IncreasingPowerDisparityBetween Defense and
Prosecution
The increased caseload created by the tough anti-crime
stance affects both prosecutors and defenders. However, the
two sides do not feel the effects equally. The variety and
amount of resources available to defense counsels lag far behind
those available to prosecutors. The recent increases in the
formal and informal power of prosecutors work to the
disadvan49
defendants.
indigent
especially
defendants,
tage of
Public defenders are unable to keep up with their expanding caseloads. For example, fifteen public defenders in
Nashville, Tennessee, handled 12,500 cases in 1987. Sixteen
public defenders in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, currently receive
4,500 appointments per year.'50 Costs for indigent defense
services rise along with the number of cases. In state courts,
the cost of providing indigent defense more than tripled between

1" See Moss, supra note 12, at 34.
14 Kerr, supra note 55, at A28.
146 Id.
147 id.

148
9

Id.

" See Timothy R. Murphy, Indigent Defense and the U.S. War on Drugs:
The Public Defender's Losing Battle, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1991, at 14.
150 Stacey Colino, When Justice Goes Begging, The Crisis in Indigent
Defense, STUDENT LAW., Oct. 1988, at 14.
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1976 and 1982.151 From 1982 to 1986, costs increased further
by a national average of 60%.152 Prosecutors, in comparison,
work under much better conditions. By the late 1980s, prosecutors in many state jurisdictions had at least three times the
budget of public defenders for pursuing cases." s In addition,
largely in response to the federal government's increased focus
on drug prosecution, the number of federal prosecutors doubled
from 1980 to 1990, while federal public defense expenditures
lagged far behind."M
Current federal policy.., is grounded on the premise
that indigent defense is solely the responsibility of
state and local government... While at least 70% of
defendants arrested for drug or drug-related offenses
qualify for and are appointed defense counsel because
of indigency, there is no acknowledgment of the need
for more resources for indigent defense services in
the entire NationalDrug ControlStrategy promulgated by the White House in September 1989.155
In addition to increased manpower, prosecutors today possess better bargaining tools and more power to negotiate with
defendants than they previously enjoyed. These tools include
longer sentences, mandatory sentences, and worsening jail and
prison conditions. Prosecutors armed with mandatory sentences
effectively determine an offender's punishment when they
choose a specific charge. This altering of traditional plea-bargaining policies has led to fears that prosecutors have too much
control over the pace and outcome of litigation.

.51Robert L. Spangenberg, Containing the Costs of Indigent Defense
Programs: Eligibility Screening and Cost Recovery Procedures, NAT'L INST.
JUST., 1986, at 1.
152 John B. Arango, Defense Services for the Poor, CRIM. JUST., Summer
1989, at 29. See also Murphy, supra note 149, at 16, 18.
1'3 Colino, supra note 150, at 14.
15 Hinds, supra note 54, at Al.
165 Murphy,

Colino, supra note 150, at 14.

supra note 149, at 18. But see Timothy R. Murphy, Indigent

Update, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1991, at 17 (Some recent congressional action, most
notably The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1990, indicates there may be
an increase in federal assistance for state indigent defender programs.).
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3. Declining JudicialDiscretion
Judges fear that the war rhetoric limits their discretion at
a time when discretion is needed most. Many judges believe
that to appropriately respond to the needs of a diverse group of
offenders requires a wide range of justice and social service
options including treatment, counseling, and supervision programs, as well as jail and prison terms. However, the comparatively costly construction of incarceration facilities is by far the
preferred option of policy-makers.' 5 6
Mandatory sentencing, especially minimum mandatory
sentencing, is a popular tactic in state, as well as federal, justice
systems, but eliminates what was one way for local justices to
balance offender and community needs.1 57 At one time, judges
could balance these needs, as well as community resources such
as treatment, training, and counseling programs, when determining the sanctions that should be imposed on an offender.
But today, mandatory sentencing and the distribution of resources within a particular system limit sentencing. Even
where sentencing standards allow local justice officials to tailor
responses to a specific offender and community, the lack of
supervisory mechanisms, treatment programs, and jail and
prison facilities can render such authority meaningless. Finally,
judges are beginning to complain publicly that mandatory
minimum sentences are often too harsh, particularly for minor,
first-time drug offenders. "The bottom line," said United States
District Judge Robert McNichols of Washington, "is we're
putting people in prison who don't belong there - and the
' 8
prisons are bulging at the seams."
Since the Comprehensive Crime Control Act became law in
1984, Congress has continued to establish hundreds of mandatory minimum sentences, primarily for drug-related offenses."59
' The results have been dramatic. In 1990, the average
prison sentence for manufacturing, distributing, or possessing 1
kilogram of heroin was 10 years without parole, while the

"sSee Ethan A. Nadelmann, DrugProhibitionin the United States: Costs,
Consequences, and Alternatives, 245 SCIENCE 939, 941 (1989).
1567See, e.g., DAVID W. NEUBAUER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN MIDDLE AMERICA
6-17 (1974).
5 Epstein, supra, note 54, at 4A.
19 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98473, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 3182.
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average for homicide was 6.6 years and for sex offenses the
average was 5.1 years."6 In U.S. district courts the average
prison sentence imposed for drug offenses increased 43.9%
between 1980 and 1987,61 and as noted previously, more than
half of federal prison inmates are serving mandatory prison
sentences for drug-related charges.
B. JUSTICE SYSTEM RESPONSES

1. Plea Bargaining
It is hard to know whether President Bush was optimistic,
naive, or disingenuous when he included the restrictions on plea
bargaining in his plan for taking "back the streets by taking
criminals off the street."'62 Despite President Bush's rhetoric,
nearly 90% of all criminal case dispositions in state and federal
courts are now, and will likely continue to result from plea
bargains."6 Creating a justice system with an expedient
method for plea bargaining continues to be the primary concern
of the most recent reforms.
Defense attorneys increasingly focus on determining what
defendants actually did, knowing the market value of pleading
particular acts within the system, and negotiating for a dismissal, or a charge or charges that will result in the least amount of
punishment. This approach might offend those with visions of
a judicial process dominated by extensive pretrial work, trials,
thorough sentencing reports, and careful, flexible sentencing
options and policies. However, expedient plea bargaining
systems are perhaps the best method for reducing backlog,
given the scarcity of defense resources and the massive demands placed on courts by the crime war.
2. Caseflow Management Programs
The administrative crises that expanding caseloads create
in many jurisdictions force trial courts to adopt more effective
and expeditious case processing procedures." Court manage160 Epstein, supra, note 54, at 4A.
1611989 SOURCEBOOK,supra note 6, at 494.
1

" PresidentBush Proposes New Anti.Crime Measures, supra note 47, at 7.

1631989 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 492, 500, 510.
164 See COURT DELAY, supra note 138, at 30-36, 75-83; Civil Litigation,
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ment organizations and state court administrative offices have
urged trial courts to design and implement comprehensive
caseflow management programs. These programs encourage
attorneys to meet with their clients soon after arrest, to provide
prosecutors the information and authority needed to fashion
reasonable plea offers quickly, to enable courts to monitor case
progress, to limit "courtesy" continuances, and to provide accurate and timely sentencing reports."
Today's conventional wisdom about judicial system management urges courts to play a coordinating role in caseflow
management. There is an expectation that every justice system
component, including defense attorneys and especially public
defense attorneys, are to function as part of an administrative
team. Each member must pay as much attention as possible to
the effective and expeditious processing of the caseload as it
pays to its specialized role within the system. Court-led interagency working groups - composed ofjudges, private attorneys,
court managers, public defenders, and prosecutors - focus on
administrative procedures. These groups are an effective tool
for increasing justice system efficiency.'6 The active cooperation of nonjudicial agencies such as police departments and
corrections departments, prosecutors, and public defenders is
also crucial for courts to develop successfully a more efficient
case processing system.'"
Recent justice system reform has focused heavily on
developing mechanisms for assembling vital information early
in the case." To respond to the rapidly increasing caseloads
triggered by recent anti-crime tactics, the system needs information at the outset about the incident, the accused, and the
realistic availability of sentencing alternatives. The space for
incarceration, the resources for treatment or probation, the
chances for conviction and the case's broader legal merits all
influence the process. Case studies in a variety of jurisdictions
reveal that through reorganization of the procedures, information needed to dispose of cases earlier in the judicial process can

supra note 138.
1'6 See,

e.g., BARRY MAHONEY, CHANGING TIMES IN TRIAL COuRTS 81-90

(1988); Martin & Maron, supra note 141, at 269.
65

167

16

See supra note 165.

See supra note 165.
See MAHONEY, supra note 165, at 79-80.

102

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PuBLIC POLICY [Vol. 1:69

be obtained.'6 9 The modification of police, probation, and pretrial release agency procedures can help insure more rapid
assemblage of crucial information. In addition, the development
of procedures for assigning defense counsel that insure early
client contact would expedite the judicial process. Furthermore,
prosecutors can assign staff with the skill and authority needed
to put together realistic plea offers early in the process. Finally,
courts can encourage, through rule changes, more pre-arraignment conferences, scheduling conferences, pretrial conferences,
and motion hearings that facilitate earlier meetings between
attorney and client, quicker case preparation, and expedited
pleas and sentencing. 7 °
Caseflow management will not enable the justice system to
overcome all of the numerous detrimental effects accompanying
the war on crime. No system can overcome poorly conceived,
poorly implemented, and ultimately unworkable public policy,
simply by altering administrative procedures. Instead, improving indigent defense requires a direct confrontation with the
sources of the hostile climate toward the accused now present
throughout the nation.
CONCLUSION
To serve today's indigent adequately, defense counsel must
move far beyond negotiating on behalf of the accused, case-bycase, plea bargain by plea bargain. Defenders need to move
beyond simply asking for more resources in an attempt to match
the increasing resources of prosecutors. Serving the indigent
requires systematically and relentlessly confronting the sources
of a climate that is hostile to indigent defense. In particular,
the advocates of indigent defense must confront the lack of
realistic direction, the deception and misinformation, the callousness, and the political opportunism that characterize the
nation's anti-crime efforts. Moreover, if they are to confront the
war on crime successfully, the advocates of indigent defense
must ally themselves with judges, prosecutors, court administrators, and other justice system actors.
Supporters need to promote detailed planning efforts that
anticipate the changes in statutes and enforcement policies.

169 Id.
170 See Id.; Martin & Maron, supra note 141; COURT DELAY, supra note

138; Civil Litigation, supra note 138.
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They need to work with courts and other justice system agencies
to develop their assessments of what effect policy changes will
have on the justice system and the provision of indigent defense.
They must express their views directly to policy-makers during
the formulation of plans for implementing legislation and policy.
Champions of improved indigent defense should sponsor
and facilitate examinations of the effects of new tactics on both
their local justice systems and their communities. Despite the
billions of dollars spent each year in the on-going war on crime,
we know remarkably little about victimization trends in local
communities or what happens when local resources are redirected to the justice system from other priorities. We need to know
the intricacies of the relationships between crime, crime control,
and broader social forces, such as a poor economy. Most importantly, we need to know whether or not increases in justice
system activity improve the quality of life within a community.
Proponents need to stand up to politicians who manipulate
public fear of crime by perpetuating a myth of increasing violence in every corner of the nation. They especially need to
stand up to politicians who bash justice systems and transform
them into scape-goats for broader policy failures.
Finally, spokespersons for improved indigent defense must
convey to the American public a more complete and realistic
image of crime, crime control, and the effects policies have on
the nation's communities. The message must include the pain
and suffering that have accompanied the war on crime. Frustrated practitioners, desolate crime victims, and often equally
desolate crime perpetrators, fill the criminal justice system
today. Americans need to see the human casualties of the war
on crime.

